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This memo intends to identify and link together a number of crucial topics concern-
ing the licensing for the purpose of re-use of Public Sector Information under the
Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of public sector information (the PSI Directive)
and in connection with the draft Proposal for a Directive amending the Directive
unveiled December 2011. The purpose of the document is threefold: first, to assist
in the design of exercises concerning PSI licensing that might be launched in the
near future, such as the preparation of a multi-level conference on the issue, aimed
at bringing together stakeholders, scholars, the open data community, policy mak-
ers and the general public; second, to provide the conceptual terms of reference for
the setting up of research projects, thematic networks or other cooperative initia-
tives in the area; and third to prepare the ground for the discussion of possible com-
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tion with “recommended licensing conditions and formats” as provided by Recital
18 of the draft Proposal.
KEYWORDS
IP Law, Competition Law, Public Sector Information (PSI), PSI Re-Use, PSI Li-
censing
* I wish to thank Claudio Artusio, Juan Carlos de Martin, Raimondo Iemma, Federico Mor-
ando, Cristiana Sappa (all from the Nexa Center for Internet and Society) and Mireille van
Eechoud (IVIR) for their comments and criticism on various drafts of this paper. The stand-
ard disclaimer, that I remain responsible for all remaining mistakes and other shortcomings
in this text, is in this case even more appropriate than usual, given the still tentative nature
of the views expressed here.
** marco.ricolfi@studiotosetto.it; Tosetto, Weigmann e Associati.
416 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 6:3
1. METHODOLOGY
This memo, while building on the state of the art of the current debate, in-
cluding the LAPSI contribution to it (Discussion Paper No 4),1 intends to fo-
cus on unsettled issues and to give priority to the difficulties and complexi-
ties which arise when the licensing of PSI is looked at from different per-
spectives.
The methodology followed in this memo is to a large extent different
from the one adopted in the parallel memo drafted on charging policy. 2 The
inquiry there adopted a horizontal approach, in that it was based on the iden-
tification of separate sets of legal, economic and “other” issues and on the
interaction among those components.3 Here a vertical component is added to
the analysis, based on the idea that the very notion of “licensing” may turn
out to be in need of a thorough reconceptualization when applied to PSI. In
this respect, the assumption that “licensing” concerning PSI is just an ex-
pansion or extension of the notion that has been used for a long time in con-
nection with Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) will  be subjected to scru-
tiny. Therefore a first, more traditional part of the document will follow the
pattern of the first memo and will therefore be devoted to the identification
of the relevant sets of questions and to the spelling out of their reciprocal in-
teractions (chapter 2); a second part will be devoted to exploring whether
and how the notion of license as applied to PSI is in need of reconceptual-
ization (chapters 3-12) and to spell out the implications this reconceptualiza-
tion may have on the way we look at the traditional issues (chapters 13-14).
A Conclusion will follow.
2. AN INVENTORY OF OPEN LEGAL ISSUES
The current list of legal issues concerning PSI licensing4 includes:
a) the relationship between IPRs and licensing,  including considera-
tion of IPRs as a basis for licensing and the interplay between the
goals of IPR protection and licensing; 
1 LAPSI,  2011,  'The  “licensing”of  Public  Sector  Information',  Informatica  e  diritto,  2011,  
pp.  129-146,  <http://www.lapsi-project.eu/lapsifiles/LAPSI-Position_paper-Licensing-adv_
draft.pdf>.
2 LAPSI, 2012, 'Charging Policy: A Conceptual Framework for EU Guidance to the Member
States', <http://www.lapsi-project.eu/lapsifiles/lapsi_charging_conceptual_framework.pdf>.
3 LAPSI, 'Charging Policy: A Conceptual Framework for EU Guidance to the Member States',
quoted above at note 2, §§ 3-4.
4 See e.g. LAPSI, 2011, 'The “licensing”of Public Sector Information', quoted above at note 1,
par. 3 where references. The list presented here  builds on that discussion paper.
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b) the determinants of the choice between a transactional and a non-
transactional approach in allowing PSI re-use;
c) the role of public domain dedication as an alternative to PSI licens-
ing;
d) standard licenses and electronic formats;
e) the alternative between open and non-open, commercial and non-
commercial licenses for PSI;
f) the controversial role of share alike clauses in the PSI context;
g) the  complications  arising  when licensed  PSI  includes  data  bases
and/or individual data;
h) the question whether PSI licenses should be “coupled” or “decou-
pled” from obligations to be undertaken by re-users to respect data
protection rules; 5
i) the identification of other contractual undertakings which may re-
users may be required to give (e.g. in view of preserving the quality
of the data); 6
j) the steps required to make sure that public sector bodies holding
PSI (PSIHs) obtain upstream, from their employees or independent
providers,  title  over  data,  data sets  and documents  which  seam-
lessly fits the rights granted downstream by the same PSIHs to their
re-users;
k) openness,  standardization and interoperability  of  the different  li-
cense sets;
l) the available alternatives in licensing terms, including national “of-
ficial”,  top down licenses,  such as the UK Open Government Li-
cense and the French License Ouverte, and bottom up licenses, such
as CC and Open Data Commons Licenses;
m) the institutional design within which licensing decisions are taken
and reviewed, including the coordination between Member States
Public Administrations7 and the inquiry on the appropriateness of
5 On this specific issue see MORANDO, F. 2012,  Ad Hoc Licenses, Dominant License Models and
(the Lack of) Interoperability, slides 12, 19-21 presented at the LAPSI Budapest conference of
22-23  March  2012,  <http://www.lapsi-project.eu/lapsifiles/2011_10_21-budapest-mor-
ando-legal_interoperability.pdf>.
6 Also feedback by re-users (in form of updates, data correction and the like) to the PSIH may
be considered; the question here is whether the matter should be dealt with in a license
clause or by other means (e.g. as an option which the PSIH unilaterally gives to the re-user
by a feature of its website).
7 As required by EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions A Digital Agenda for Europe, Brussels, 19.05.2010 Com (2010) 245,
15.
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one-size-fits all rules, which in this case links to the choice among
the alternatives referred to in lett. l. above.
It is submitted that further insights might be gained by a closer look at sev-
eral other less debated topics.
a) These  should  include  the  issue  of  “backfiring”:  the  question
whether licensing policies, which may be recommended in view of
their re-user friendliness (e.g. in connection with the issue referred
to in lett. h. above) and their anticipated positive impact on dissemi-
nation of PSI,  may in fact  entail  costs,  risks  or other burdens on
PSIHs and therefore have a negative impact on the decision of the
same PSIHs to make PSI accessible to begin with. 
b) Also a fresh look at the relationship between IPRs and licensing in
the specific field of PSI re-use might help, particularly if it extended
to considering the  fundamental  questions.  Thus,  we should look
much more closely than it  is  usually done at the issue raised by
Recital 22 of the PSI Directive, which states: “The Directive does not
affect the existence or ownership of intellectual property rights of public
sector bodies, nor does it limit the exercise of these rights in any way be-
yond the boundaries set by this Directive…Public sector bodies should,
however, exercise their copyright in a way that facilitates re-use”. How
can this wish of the EU legislature be fulfilled? More specifically, it
should  be  asked  whether,  taking  for  granted  the  European  ap-
proach whereby PSI is IP-protected, licensing is the appropriate pri-
vate ordering tool whereby the restrictive potential of IP exclusivity
is from time to time corrected and fine tuned and, if and to the ex-
tent necessary, turned on its head by enabling “re-opening” in view
of re-use what IP has restricted and closed to begin with.8
The PSI licensing issues just referred to, which we may here for the sake
of convenience lump together as “standard legal issues”, do not come in a
vacuum. To look at them we should adopt a multi-level approach, consider-
ing that their appreciation requires at a minimum taking into account three
other legal dimensions and a technological one.
In a legal perspective, it should be noted first that the PSI Directive is
based on the goal of fostering the emergence of EU-wide, cross-border in-
formation services; therefore the principle of freedom to provide services as
8 See below chapters 11-15.
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enshrined in Art. 56 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) is due to play a crucial role.
Second, it is well established that competition law is relevant to PSI li-
censing in several ways.9 Art. 8(1), in dealing with re-use conditions, pro-
vides that “these conditions shall not unnecessarily restrict possibilities for re-use
and shall not be used to restrict competition”. The Directive additionally man-
dates that conditions for re-use should not be discriminatory (Recital 19; Art.
10). Exclusivity is in principle banned (Art. 11). It is therefore submitted that
already under the original design of the Directive, the principles governing
licenses for re-use of public sector information were intended to be consis-
tent with the quest for economic efficiency as embodied in competition law
principles; that these Directive’s far-reaching rules embodying competition
law principles were intended to relieve re-users of the costs of enforcing
competition law rules directly; that this duty of consistency can at no time
be called into question,  and that these principles  hold even more true in
connection with the currently proposed review of the rules, as compliance
with Artt. 101, 102 and 106 TFEU is mandated by directly applicable pri-
mary EU law.
The above list of questions leads to the third level:  subsidiarity. One can
imagine here the starting point: what is the legal basis for EU action in this
area and its  limit?  What is  the level  of  sovereignty retained by Member
States in the area of PSI licensing policy? What are the implications of the
principle of proportionality? How does EU action interact with rules and
regulations established by Member State sovereigns on the one hand and
private ordering on the other, as emerging in the various bottom up efforts
to  establish  smoothly  functioning  sets  of  licensing  terms  and conditions
specifically intended for PSI?
This line of reasoning should move on to asking what other legal do-
mains are relevant to PSI licensing, directly or indirectly. Some replies are
already pretty clear, on the basis of the foregoing.
a) Freedom of information acts (FOIA) may interact with passive but
even active release of PSI and impact on its re-use;
b) Data protection law is evolving; and it opens up the possibility of
an institutional design which may accommodate privacy concerns
9 See  LAPSI, 2011, 'The “licensing”of Public Sector Information', quoted above at note 1, par.
2.
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in ways which allow the “decoupling” of data protection rules from
licensing agreements between PSIHs and re-users.10
c) Intellectual property laws provide the foundations on which licens-
ing, including the one by PSIHs, is based. 
d) The  practical  jurisprudence  which  goes  under  the  name of  legal
process, which has contributed so much in defining the respective
roles of case law and statutes, of rules produced by sovereigns and
private ordering in dealing with complex legal phenomena,11 might
go a long way in helping us to focus on the institutional design ap-
propriate in order to accommodate bottom up private ordering ef-
forts with legal rules established by national and regional legisla-
tures.
The technological dimension of licensing deals with formats and interoper-
ability. If data sets are to be re-used; and they are to be re-used both by end-
users and by intermediate users which incorporate them as components of
further products or services in ways which cannot be anticipated ex ante,
then the formats should be as re-use friendly as possible. Additionally, only
open, machine readable formats should be selected by PSIHs, leaving it to
the freedom of re-users downstream to match and interface data sets with-
out limitations. Proprietary formats, i.e.  formats which are based on soft-
ware or other IP which is privately owned, are not easily interoperable and
should  therefore  be  avoided.12 The  emergence  of  free,  open  standards
should be encouraged; also proprietary standards should be avoided, lest
free content made available by PSIHs is appropriated via control of the stan-
dards in which it comes.13 Semantic interoperability through Linked Open
Data extends the potential of technical interoperability by resorting to tools
10 An assessment of the recent developments is in the Opinion of the European Data Protection
Supervisor on the ‘Open Data Package’ of the European Commission  including a Proposal for a
Directive  amending Directive 2003/98/EC on re-use  of  public  sector  information (PSI),  a
Communication on Open Data and Commission Decision  2011/833/EU on the re-use  of
Commission  documents,  <http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/
shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2012/12-04-18_Open_data_EN.pdf>.
11 See, in areas germane to the ones discussed here, MERGES, R. P. 2000, 'One Hundred Years
of Solicitude.  Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000',  Cal. L. Rev., vol.  88, pp. 2189 ff. and
MERGES, R. P. 1996 'Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Col -
lective Rights Organisations', Cal. L. Rev., vol. 84, pp. 1293 ff. 
12 See in this connection BOYLE, J. 2008, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind,
Yale  University  Press,  also  available  at  <http://thepublicdomain.org/download>  or  at
<http://yupnet.org/boyle/archives/169>; BOYLE, J. 2003, 'The Second Enclosure Movement
and the Construction of the Public Domain', Law & Contemp. Prob., vol. 66, pp. 68 ff., also
available at <http://www.law.duke.edu/boylesite/>.
13 These are important requirements, as technology enables the “capture” of the resource in
digital form and its degradation “from a non-rivalrous, non exclusionary public good” into
a privately owned good along the lines discussed by HESS, C. & OSTROM, E. 2007, 'Intro-
duction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons', in C. Hess & E. Ostrom (eds.), Under-
standing Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice , MIT Press, Cambridge-London,
pp. 3 ff.: p. 10.
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intended to overcome the fragmentation of data from different sources by
adopting standards and tools for the identification, retrieval and the repre-
sentation  of  such  data  to  ensure  that  their  meaning  is  not  lost  in  the
process.14 New dimensions may be opened by reference to organizational
interoperability.
Several provisions of the Directive deal with issues that impact on the
technical interoperability of licensed PSI data sets.
Art. 5 of the Directive indicates that the availability of PSI in electronic
formats is encouraged, but not mandated. It would however seem that un-
der the current conditions there is not much room to make progress in this
area. The current text of Art. 3 of the Directive implies that the decision as to
whether to allow re-use of PSI held by PSIHs or not is currently left to Mem-
ber States, which, in turn, may refer the decision to the same PSIHs. Also
Recital 9 clearly indicates that “the decision whether or not to authorize re-use
will remain with the Member States or the public sector body concerned”. In such
a context, any provision mandating formats (e.g. machine readable formats,
which  are  a  prerequisite  of  interoperability),  might  backfire  (see  above,
chapter 2). Member States and PSIHs belonging to them might simply de-
cide not to allow re-use of all the PSI which does not originally come in ma-
chine readable format. As a result, the pool of data sets candidate to being
merged would shrink rather than expand. Openness and interoperability of
software formats is also encouraged (Recital 13); but again the correspond-
ing choice is left in the hands of Member States and of the PSIHs falling un-
der their jurisdiction.
Art.  9 of the Directive,  concerning “practical  arrangements”,  takes for
granted the limitations in formats of the underlying documents just referred
to. It however builds provisions concerning two kinds of facilities which
may contribute to interoperability. The first concerns tools “that facilitate the
search for documents available for re-use, such as asset lists, accessible preferably
on line, of main documents” (see also Recitals 15 and 23). The second concerns
“portal sites that are linked to decentralized assets lists” (see also Recitals 15 and
23).
While Member States are under an obligation to take action in both re-
gards, the extent of the obligation is quite limited. Asset lists may not be ac-
cessible on line; they need not to be complete, but only include “main docu-
14 On the action of the European Interoperability Forum see Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale, SPC
Sistema Pubblico  di  Connettività  e  Cooperazione,  Commissione di  coordinamento  SPC,
Linee Guida per l’Interoperabilità Semantica Attraverso i Linked Open Data, 30 July 2012.
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ments”. Limitations in the availability of asset lists reflect on the effective-
ness of portals. Again, no limitation as to proprietary software, formats or
standards is to be found in these provisions.15
It should be noted that, once concerns about formats and interoperability
are dealt with, data should be made available without worrying too much
about their presentation. As Tim Berners Lee said a while ago, “raw data
now!” should be the guiding principle. After all, governments are not in the
business  of  providing admirable  portals;  their  mission in this  connection
consists in giving back to taxpayers the data which they collected, generated
and stored away with taxpayers’ money.16
One might have the impression that the route undertaken here may lead
to some form of progress in carrying out the horizontal approach indicated
in the opening chapter. It would also appear that a mass of empirical evi-
dence has been accumulating in the last decade, starting from the replies to
public consultations, to the experiences on the ground as the ones accumu-
lated by Europeana (as far as licensing is concerned) or by Member State
Governments (see the UK asset register), the never ending debates in spe-
cialized  lists:  the  wealth of  experiences,  practices  and discussion  on  the
same is amazing. However, the approach taken thus far is neglecting one
crucial issue, which is examined next.
3. DO WE KNOW WHAT DO WE KNOW?
Fact is that we keep talking about licensing, about licensing PSI, without
asking the single most crucial issue:17 what are the essential features of the
notion of “licensing” as it has emerged and grown in the last couple of cen-
turies? What kind of activities are as a rule planned and implemented on
the basis of the transaction we have come to indicate as “licensing” a long
15 The Draft Proposal builds on the new text of Art. 3(1), according to which re-use is at least
in principle mandated. Nevertheless the changes are rather cautious and include (i) refer-
ence to metadata (in Art. 5, par. 1); (ii) a suggestion that the format ensuring interoperability
follows the principles adopted by the Inspire directive (Directive 2007/2/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2007 establishing an Infrastructure for Spatial In-
formation in the European Community) (Recital 11 replacing Recital 13); (iii) redrafting of
Art. 9 to extend to metadata and to promote machine readability.
16 See ROBINSON, D., YU, H., ZELLER, W.P. & FELTEN E.W. 2009,  'Government Data And
The Invisible Hand', Yale J.L. & Tech., vol. 11, pp. 160 ff., who at 161 refer to the engineering
principle of separating the provision of data from the job of allowing the interaction with
them.
17 This is to a large extent a self-critical assessment. The drafter of this document has also draf -
ted a number of other documents (including LAPSI, 2011, 'The “licensing”of Public Sector
Information', quoted above at note 1), without ever stopping to pause and ask whether and
to which extent the conditions of use of the notion of “licensing” applied and which modi-
fications the tool of licensing undergoes when it comes into contact with digital assets and
specifically PSI.
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time ago?18 Has licensing taken a shape which builds on IP exclusivity to en-
hance its power to control and to restrict the exploitation of IP in view of
profit maximization? If so, may the same licensing also prove an appropri-
ate tool to structure transactions which have as an object PSI and where li-
censor is a PSIH? 
Once this question is asked, one may have the impression that these par-
allelisms and differences have not been sufficiently charted and explored
yet  to  enable  an  adequate  perception  of  the  specificity  of  PSI  licensing.
Frankly, the very question of the existence of differences in the meaning of
the notion of licensing as applied to IP and to PSI, respectively, would not
appear to have surfaced at all, showing that this may have been a classical
case not only of not knowing but also of not knowing of not knowing. May
be we can try to find out whether there is any difficulty in transposing the
notion of licensing from its field of origin to PSI and, if the reply is in the af-
firmative, where the difficulty lies; and to turn what hitherto have been un-
known unknowns into known unknowns, which means becoming aware of
the similarities and dissimilarities of the notion of licensing when it applies,
respectively, to traditional IP and to PSI.
4. “CLASSICAL” IP LICENSING
It is well known that the subject matter of “classical” licensing has been, in
the last two or three centuries,  trademarks, patents, copyrights and other
IPR variously related to the same. By licensing, the holder of the rights, as
the case might be, in the symbol, in the solution to the technical problem, in
the work, rather than engaging in the manufacture of all the articles (be they
bottles, brakes or books), authorized a (related or unrelated) third party to
engage in the production and sale of the same. While the object of the IPR,
be it a logo, an invention or a work, was one individual ideal entity, the –
potentially infinite – copies which might embody it, be they Coca Cola bot-
tles,  brakes  or  books,  did  have  a  discrete,  physical,  material,  tangible
(“hard”) existence, locating them in the bricks-and-mortar world. This dual-
ity of IP was described in the tradition of classical IP law by contrasting the
ideal (corpus mysticum) and the real entity (corpus mechanicum). Classic IP li-
censing concerns both: the authorization of licensor concerns the economic
exploitation of the ideal entity, also of the corpus mysticum; the performance
18 See the treatment of the notion of licensing by a practice oriented textbook as the one by
PARSONS, TH. 1907, Laws of Business, Hartford, pp. 685 ff. (the first edition had already ap-
peared in 1878).
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of the contract by licensee leads to the manufacture, sale and dissemination
of tangible, “bricks-and-mortar”, entities, leading to the manufacture, sale
and exploitation of corpora mechanica, each of them using up a given amount
of physical resources to come into being.19
5. PSI LICENSING
This situation is in stark contrast to the subject matter of the licensing of PSI.
Also PSI may come – and normally does come, at least in European jurisdic-
tions – as IP protected subject matter: works, content, data sets and meta-
data concerning them, which usually are protected under copyright, data
base right or sui generis rights20 rather than being in the public domain. Here
again we may distinguish between the  corpus mysticum and the  corpus me-
chanicum.  While  the  authorization  of  licensor  concerns  the  economic  ex-
ploitation of the ideal entity, also of the corpus mysticum, exactly as in “clas-
sical” licensing, the performance of the contract shows a marked difference
to traditional licensing of trademarks, patents, copyright and other IP rights.
The difference consists in the fact that the performance of the license con-
cerning  PSI  brings  into  existence  digital  copies  rather  than  of  tangible,
“brick-and-mortar” entities.
6. FROM CLASSIC IP LICENSING TO DIGITAL LICENSING
A few remarks may be in place here. First, also digital copies are corpora me-
chanica,  in that they are material,  physical copies,  even though intangible
ones: while we may not touch them in the same way as we touch a bottle, a
brake or a book, nevertheless they consist of electric or magnetic currents,
forming a predetermined sequence of bits, which has a separate, discrete ex-
istence from other sequences of bits.21 Second, also digital copies, intangible
as they may be, can be incorporated into stable, material embodiments, be
they the plastic medium of DVDs or the discrete location assigned to them
19 Copyright entails several complications in this respect, as it enables rightholders to engage
also in what is described as immaterial exploitation of the work [see artt. 11(1)(2), 11 bis(1)
(1) and (2), 11ter(1) (2), 14(1)(2) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention 1886], described as
“public  performance”  in  the  UK,  “public  display”  in  the  US  and  “unkörperliche
Werknutzung” in German speaking countries. However, this does not affect the analysis be-
low in § 17: even immaterial exploitation used to require resort to physical, bricks-and-mor-
tar embodiments, be they the ‘master’ used for broadcasting or performance of movies, the
signal used in broadcasting and does not enable the creation of infinite costless copies as it
happens when the protected subject matter assumes digital form. 
20 See DERCLAYE, E. 2008, 'Does the Directive on the Re-use of Public Sector Information af -
fect the State’s database sui-generis right?', in J. Gaster, E. Schweighofer & P. Sint (eds.),
Knowledge Rights – Legal, societal and related technological aspects, Austrian Computer Society ,
pp. 137 ff.
21 See ROMANO, R.  2001,  L’opera  e  l’esemplare  nel  diritto  della  proprietà intellettuale,  Cedam,
Padova, p. 152 and note 35 at pp. 224 ff.
2012] M. Ricolfi: Licensing – A Conceptual Framework for EU Guidance 425
in a server or in another device. Third, and more importantly for present
purposes, they differ from tangible copies in that they may be multiplied in
infinite numbers of perfect copies at costs which approximate zero.
While this last specific feature of digital copies is liable to have signifi-
cant consequences, to which we will come back in a moment, it should be
noted that digital copies which characterize PSI are by no means a novelty
in the landscape of IP licensing.  Indeed,  the last  four decades have wit-
nessed to the emergence first and to the explosion later of digital licensing:
software licensing22 has been followed by agreements providing,  inter alia,
for the making available in digital form works and content (digital publish-
ing) or data sets (data base agreement). Now, in all the relevant regards,
digital and software licensing show the same features we discussed in con-
nection with PSI licensing, including the fact that the intangible copy based
on the original program may be multiplied in infinite numbers of perfect
copies at costs which approximate zero. Indeed, this is the case for the quite
obvious reason that PSI and software share the characteristic of coming by
in digital format. Thus we may reach an intermediate conclusion: both digi-
tal licensing and PSI licensing share a common characteristic which differ-
entiates  them both from “classical”  licensing.  The analysis  does not  end
here, though.
7. THE BIFURCATION OF DIGITAL LICENSING
Indeed, digital licensing as originally experienced and analyzed by the legal
literature concerned proprietary software. In this  perspective  software li-
censing typically is a market transaction, which is entered into in the form
of a market exchange whereby licensee pays a consideration to licensor in
exchange for the benefits expected from the exploitation of the licensed soft-
ware.
It should however be noted that this feature is in stark contrast with a
further, totally different breed of digital licensing which emerged more or
less at the same time, which typically does not embody a for profit market
transaction. Open source software licensing was the starting point for this
more or less simultaneous development. At a later stage also music, images,
photographs, audiovisual products and text have been made freely avail-
able over the net in digital format to an extent which would have been diffi-
22 See HEFFAN, I. V. 1997, 'Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age', Stan-
ford Law Rev vol. 49, pp. 1487 ff.
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cult to anticipate at the turn of the century. The form this dissemination has
taken was once again described as “licensing”, even though also here the
copies made available to licensees typically are intangible and digital, as op-
posed to tangible, material and analogical. 
This “new” licensing tends to exhibit strikingly novel features. It may be
“public”, in that the prospective licensees are not specific individuals or en-
tities  but  the public  at  large,  as it  befits  transaction which typically  take
place on line; it may be “non transactional”, where the grant of the license
does not require any form of acceptance, including the “clicking” to indicate
acceptance of the terms of the license itself,  by the licensee; it  may – but
need not – be “open”, in the meaning of the notion adopted in the Open
Knowledge Definition. It is difficult  to find labels accurate enough to de-
scribe the two varieties of digital  licensing,  referred to in  this  chapter.  It
would not be entirely accurate to characterize them respectively as propri-
etary and non proprietary; market and non market; or closed and open. In-
deed, even open source licensing is based on IP ownership; copyright pro-
tection  of  software  forms  the  basis  for  open source  licensing,  so  that  it
hardly can be described as “non-proprietary”; hybrid phenomena, where
market and non market transaction coexist, are one of the most significant
features both of open source licensing and of the latter, “new” licensing of
digital content.23
What I find striking, however, is the divergence in the approach taken
by the two varieties of digital licensing in connection with the same funda-
mental issue: how to deal with the fact that licensed digital copies may be
multiplied in an infinite number of perfect copies at costs which approxi-
mate zero.
In the first  variety of digital  licensing  (“proprietary”,  “market  based”
and “closed”),  the goal has been to enlist  all possible tools to ensure the
strictest control over digital copies not authorized by licensor. This goal has
been pursued both by legal  and technological  means,  that is,  by making
sure that the notion of infringing extends to the maximum extent also to
digital copies, by adopting technological measures (which may be described
as DRM or TPM depending on the circumstances) to prevent unauthorized
duplication, by invoking legislation banning circumvention of technological
measures.
23 LESSIG, L. 2008, Remix. Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy, The Penguin
Press, p. 177.
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In the second variety of digital licensing, the approach has been exactly
the opposite. Here licensor typically gives up one or more of the exclusive
rights he is legally entitled to (“some rights reserved”, as opposed to “all
rights reserved”); and in doing so authorizes, under the terms and condi-
tions of the license, not only the initial licensee, but also all the other third
parties who may at some point of the chain obtain a digital copy of the li -
censed content or work. Characteristically, licensor directly authorizes who-
ever may re-use a digital copy in accordance with license terms and condi-
tions, rather than authorizing licensee to sublicense the copies she may have
been authorized to re-use.24
The point should be made that this second approach builds on the per-
ception of two specific features of digital copies, non rivalry in consumption
and production and complementarity.25 The fact that one person uses a digi-
tal copy does not subtract anything from the consumption of the next user.
Moreover, when we take into account that digital copies may be also used
as inputs for the production of downstream goods and services, we come
across a feature which is unheard of in the bricks-and-mortar world: digital
copies are non rival also in production. In other words, one of the most re-
markable features of digital assets is that they are amenable to joint produc-
tion, that is if technology and law do not stand in the way. Additionally,
digital assets show a strong complementary character. They may be com-
bined, mixed or “matched” to create a new product or service; and in turn
these first generation products or services may be used as derivative inputs
for derivative products and services.
As a matter of fact, non rivalry and complementarity are features which
apply to all digital assets. However, we have seen that this common feature
is dealt with in two very different ways by the two varieties of digital licens-
ing. While the purpose of the first kind of digital licensing is to defuse, by
legal and technological means, the potential implicit in non-rivalry in pro-
duction and complementarity of digital assets, by restricting and disabling
non authorized re-use, the second kind of digital licensing (in its different
shades  of  being  “non-proprietary”,  “non-market”  and “open”)  strives  to
harness the same potential for its own purposes. Non-rivalry in production
and complementarity of digital assets are the basis on which the strategy of
24 See e.g. Art. 8 CCBY. 
25 These twin features, which are a corollary of the possibility of creating infinite, costless and
perfect copies,  are illustrated in their  general  terms in connection with digital  assets  by
HOFMOKL, J.  2010, 'The Internet commons: towards an eclectic theoretical Framework',
International Journal of the Commons, vol. 4, pp. 226 ff., at pp. 243 ff.
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fostering  and  encouraging  dissemination,  particularly  over  digital  net-
works, is built.
It should kept in mind that the tool used to maximize re-use of digital as-
sets which exhibit features of non-rivalry in production and complementar-
ity in re-use is direct licensing by licensor to whomever happens to obtain a
digital copy and re-uses it in accordance with license terms and conditions.
It has been remarked earlier that licensor directly authorizes whoever may
re-use a digital copy obtained through an initial licensee in accordance with
license terms and conditions; as a result also the third party becomes a li-
censee in spite of the fact that she has no direct contractual relationship or
dealing with licensor.
It should also be noted that, except in particular cases, e.g. where only
the re-use of the digital asset in unchanged form is allowed,26 the direct au-
thorization extends also to any fragment of the digital copy which is re-used
by licensee. Indeed, only entities which would not qualify under the notion
of work are not encompassed by the terms and conditions of the license.27
8. INTEROPERABILITY
The purpose of this second variety of digital licensing is constantly at risk of
being  defeated,  however,  by  the  difficulties  encountered  in  making  the
terms and conditions applying to the different digital inputs going into a
downstream product or service interoperable. This difficulty appears to be
an unavoidable consequence of direct licensing. Digital licensing of the sec-
ond variety is based on chains of authorizations structured in an automated
way, typically through on line networks. Third parties which happen to in-
corporate any number of digital inputs become licensees and are directly
authorized by licensor even if they obtain the same input not from licensor
but from another licensee and have no dealing with the licensor; all what is
required is that they comply with the terms and conditions of the original li-
cense. In practical terms this means that any given downstream product or
26 Or in data bases, where only “substantial” taking is covered by the exclusive right.
27 This incorporation of the digital fragment by a first re-user, as well as by any additional re-
user who is subsequently authorized by licensor or, in the alternative, obtains it from the
first licensee, is a feature which is enabled by the non-rivalry (in consumption and, here) in
production of digital items. One might think (as I was inclined in an early draft of this pa -
per) that this feature depends on the fact that the digital fragment is a material, albeit intan-
gible, copy, which is incorporated in the downstream product or service, so that authoriza-
tion is required for the re-use of the material – as opposed to ideal – entity. This is not so, as
the same phenomenon occurs when no physical, albeit intangible, entity is made perman-
ently available to the licensee. Imagine that the licensee does not need to download the data
to re-use them, because the data are released by means of data services or are made avail-
able in linked format. However and whenever information obtained upstream is re-used by
a licensee, either the license is triggered or the re-user is liable to an infringement action.
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service incorporates a very large number of digital inputs originating from a
large number of different licensors. Now, however, if two digital inputs are
governed by two different sets of terms and conditions, and these do not
dovetail, then their joint re-use is called into question. More specifically, re-
use is non authorized, if the terms and conditions are incompatible; or is au-
thorized on the more restrictive terms and conditions, if one set is more re-
strictive than the other, while not incompatible with it.
Herein lies a difficulty which may turn out to be much greater than one
may imagine at first glance. Indeed, scholars have noted that even licenses
which broadly speaking would appear to be to a large extent reciprocally
compatible do have clauses which do not perfectly dovetail. One good ex-
ample of this phenomenon is the attribution clause, which entails slightly
different  requirements  depending  on the  fact  that  CCBY or ODCBY ap-
plies.28
This discrepancy is liable to generate difficulties when two licensed digi-
tal inputs are incorporated into a (third) downstream service or product.
The provider of this downstream product or service is in fact bound to re-
spect at the same time the requirements of both licenses applying to the two
inputs she incorporates; an additional difficulty may arise, to the extent it is
believed – as it probably should – that compliance with the two attribution
clauses requires that the credit given identifies within the downstream ser-
vice or product the components respectively attributable to the two inputs
incorporated in it.
9. PSI INTEROPERABILITY
Against this background, the time has come to ask where is PSI to be placed
in this context. Also PSI comes in digital copies. These are clearly non rival
and amenable to joint production. Also PSI inputs show a strong comple-
mentary character, both with other PSI data sets and with user generated
content and business generated data.29 For sure PSI licensing does not be-
long to the first variety of digital licensing, “proprietary”, “market-based”
and “closed”, as by legislative fiat it follows the mandate of widest possible
28 Even though this is not specifically noted in the slides presented by MORANDO, F. 2012,
Ad Hoc Licenses,  Dominant License Models and (the Lack of) Interoperability, quoted above at
note 5, the issue has been repeatedly discussed in the meetings of the LAPSI thematic net-
work.
29 The twin features,  illustrated in their  general  terms in connection with digital  assets  by
HOFMOKL, J.  2010, 'The Internet commons: towards an eclectic theoretical Framework',
quoted above at note 25, at 243 ff., apply also to PSI as I tried to show in Public Sector Inform-
ation as Open Data. Access, Re-Use and the Third Innovation Paradigm, in Dana Beldiman
ed., forthcoming.
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– if not necessarily free – dissemination. It does belong to the second variety
of digital licensing and it shares the latter’s troubles. Indeed also the prod-
ucts and services based on PSI typically use PSI data sets as inputs by com-
bining (“matching”) them; and in turn these first-generation goods may be
used as intermediate inputs for derivative products and services. Therefore,
also PSI suffers from the difficulties involved in  ensuring interoperability
generally encountered by digital licensing of the second variety. Indeed, it
may well be that the difficulty is even greater in connection with PSI licens-
ing: it is submitted that the complementarity rate exhibited by PSI assets is
higher than that shown by music, test, audiovisual works and software. In
other words it  would appear that statistically it  may be more likely that
parts or fragments of PSI digital assets are combined and matched to form
downstream products and services  than it  is  the case in connection with
other entities (text, music, audiovisual works, software) which are the object
of digital licensing of the second variety.30
10. A TENTATIVE (STRUCTURAL) COMPARISON BETWEEN 
“CLASSICAL” AND PSI LICENSING: FIRST PART
Are we prepared to deal with this issue on the basis of our experience in
“classical” IP licensing? It is true that even there we frequently meet refer-
ences to the phenomenon of “stacking”, which describes cases in which a
downstream product requires authorization by two or more holders of IP.31
Still,  there is  a  huge difference  between the two phenomena.  Unsurpris-
ingly, a much closer analogy – actually a total coincidence – is to be found
in the second variety of digital licensing.
Let us therefore try to clarify the interoperability conundrum using as an
example PSI licensing (the picture would not be much different if we looked
at a specimen of digital licensing of the second variety). The PSIH is indi-
cated as A; it authorizes B to re-use a discrete item of PSI it holds (PSI A)
into B’s downstream product or service (B d.). C may in turn incorporate (B
d.) in her own downstream product or service (C d.). If she does so, she is
re-using (B d.) under the terms of the license between B and C; as far as (PSI
A) is concerned, however, C gets a direct authorization from A, in spite of
the fact that she has no contact with A.
30 See however LESSIG, L. 2008, Remix. Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy,
quoted above at note 23, pp. 51 ff.
31 Initiated with a different terminology (referring to patents “on basic building blocks”) by
MERGES, R. P. 1996 'Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Col -
lective Rights Organisations', referred to at note 11, pp. 1341 ff.
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This last feature is clearly shown in the licensing terms when CC licenses
are used. See Art. 8, of CCBY; art. 4.8 OdBL v. 1.0. It is submitted that this
feature is intrinsic of the mechanism adopted for the licensing of digital in-
tangible  copies,  which may “travel” from their  originator,  A, to a subse-
quent downstream user, C, through the intermediate passage point of B,
without A and C ever coming into reciprocal contact.32
Does “classical” IP licensing prepare us for this – quite extraordinary –
feature? Not at all. Rather, here we witness to a quite striking discontinu-
ity.33
Until we fail to unravel this basic difference, we are at a loss to explain
what is the meaning of “stacking” in digital and PSI licensing. In classic IP
licensing,  stacking  means  that  under  a  given  set  of  circumstances  (e.g.
partly overlapping patents) licensee must obtain multiple authorizations be-
fore she is enabled to manufacture and sell her product. Stacking works dif-
ferently in digital and PSI licensing. Here C incorporates in (C d.) her own
value added, on top of (B d.); but, as also a fragment of (PSI A) is incorpo-
rated in (B d.), she is authorized to include that digital input only if and to
the extent she complies with both the terms of the authorization by B, with
whom C has had dealings, and by A, with whom she has had no dealing at
all. As a rule, the contact between A and C is instituted by digital networks;
the work, the content, the fragment of the same carry with them the terms
of conditions for re-use, i.e. the license, or at least reference to them; meta-
data take the place of dealings between A and C, even though C gets a di -
rect license from A. In this latter perspective, “stacking” describes the phe-
nomenon whereby the conditions for re-use of (PSI A) travel with the digital
input, so that non-compliance with these latter terms by C would mean in-
fringement  of  A’s  rights  by  the  same  C;  and  they  are  therefore  added
(“stacked”) over the conditions for re-use agreed between C and B, which
may – or may not – dovetail with the former.
Therefore a crucial feature both of digital licensing of the second variety
and of  PSI  licensing  is  the  existence  of  this  sort  of  “travelling  clauses”,
which may spell out the obligations which licensee has to comply with if
her re-use is to be lawful rather than infringing. It should be noted that ref-
32 Incidentally, this explains why licenses cannot be characterized as agreements, but as uni-
lateral acts (in civil law parlance) or promises (in common law parlance); on this basis an
agreement may come into being, e.g. when licensee accepts to pay a consideration, but need
not.
33 Except when we take into consideration licensing of entities which may be self-replicating,
as  software  and  DNA-information,  which  may  be  considered  as  a  bridge  between
“classical” and PSI licensing.
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erence to travelling clauses or obligations in the plural is explained by an-
other character of digital inputs, which, as indicated, not only are non-rival
in production but exhibit a strong complementarity. As C may well incorpo-
rate the inputs coming from A, A1 and so on and the inputs coming from B,
B1, it is likely that she is bound to simultaneous compliance with different
sets of “travelling obligations”.
Should we think that this elementary situation is not intricate enough,
we can complicate it as much as we like just by turning our attention to li -
censor. Let us assume that licensor “waives” its rights in some regard, as it
may be when the licensed content incorporates data base rights. A similar
occurrence  has  been  noted where  licensor  A may  wish  to  insert  a  viral
share-alike feature in its licensed PSI, but at the same time it waives it for
certain classes of derivative content. Here the question is: does the waiver
“travel”  further  downstream when licensee  incorporates  A’s  in  her  own
product or service (B d.)? In accordance with the previous analysis, the re-
ply  should  be  in  the  affirmative.  Therefore  we  also  have  “travelling
waivers” making the landscape of PSI licensing more varied. The landscape
gets even more varied, when we think that A may wish that also B applies
the same waiver, to avoid that the re-use of its initial contribution is blocked
downstream, by data base rights or by the viral feature. If this wish takes
the form of an obligation on part of B to adopt the same waiver, a “travel-
ling waiver” (from licensor) is then combined with a “travelling obligation”
(on licensee as a candidate to become a licensor).
Does classic IP licensing prepare us to any of this? Not at all. Digital and
PSI licensing is  based on chains of authorizations,  structured in an auto-
mated way in such a manner as to enable that licensor directly authorizes
re-user even without having a direct dealing with her. Chains of authoriza-
tions are not unknown to classic IP licensing; but there they take the starkly
different route of sublicenses, whereby licensor A enables B not only to ex-
ploit directly the IP but also to authorize C (and possibly C1, C2 etc.) to ex-
ploit. Thus the question here is not one of “travelling” – and potentially mu-
tually incompatible  – obligations;  but  of  derivative compliance.34 B must
make sure that she binds C (and, if applicable, C1, C2 etc.) to the same obli-
gations as she has undertaken towards A; should C fail to comply, both C
34 As noted earlier, a similar situation may occur when licensing concerns derivative patents,
whereby C, in order to obtain a license from B, needs to obtain authorization both by B and
from A, whose upstream patent is included in B’s derivative patent. This is a rare occur-
rence, though.
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and B would be infringing A’s IP rights (and B might have recourse against
C to be held harmless of the ensuing loss). Sublicensing is a one-way route;
PSI licensing in downstream products is a maze of criss-crossing avenues.
This is explained by the fact that sublicensor sublicenses the same IP as li-
censor licenses to sublicensor; whereas PSI licensing concerns multiple digi-
tal inputs, which are multiplied as they are re-used and carry with them the
travelling clauses and obligations which concern each of them.
11. A TENTATIVE (FUNCTIONAL) COMPARISON BETWEEN 
“CLASSICAL” AND PSI LICENSING: SECOND PART
Hitherto we tried to figure out in which way PSI licensing differs from clas-
sic IP licensing from one specific angle: the presence – or, respectively, the
absence – of digital character of the licensed subject matter. The next  step
consisted in highlighting in which other way PSI licensing differs from all
other IP licensing, including digital and software licensing of the first vari-
ety (chapters 4-7); in doing so we explored the implications this difference
has on the one crucial feature of digital licensing of the second variety, in-
cluding PSI licensing, which we may miss out by neglecting the specificity
of PSI licensing.
In doing so, we noted a further difference between digital licensing of
the second variety, including PSI licensing,  on the one side and all other
kinds of IP licensing, on the other side, which consists in the fact that classic
IP licensing concerns are market transactions, whereas PSI licensing (exactly
as FLOSS) may entail, and normally do entail, non-market transactions.
This is an important distinguishing feature. Classic licensing builds on
exclusivity and on the monopoly potential of the IPR which is from time to
time its subject matter; licensor aims to maximize her returns by minutely
and tightly controlling the ways in which the licensed entity is exploited. Li-
censing uses the leverage given by IP protection to maximize profits. Digital
licensing of the first variety does the same, with a vengeance (see chapter 7):
as digital goods are prone to escape licensor’s control, the effort to restrict
by means of contract, law and technology is redoubled here. 
Digital licensing of the second variety goes, as shown (in chapter 7), the
opposite route: the potential implied in non rivalry and complementarity of
digital goods is harnessed to maximize dissemination over the networks; IP
exclusivity is used as a tool to open rather than to restrict. While it might
appear that this second approach is revolutionary, it turns out that it makes
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good sense even from a strictly economic viewpoint.  Indeed, it  has been
convincingly shown that economic decisions are made and resources are al-
located not only on the basis of market-based exchanges and firm-based hi-
erarchies, but also on the basis of sharing or peer production.35 The case has
also persuasively made that this latter mode of production is likely to gain
traction in network-driven digital environments, where it takes the form of
distributed cooperation.36
Now the time has come to go a bit further and ask in which way PSI li-
censing exhibits specific features which distinguish it from the other forms
of digital licensing of the second variety we briefly mentioned. A few notes
can be jotted down in this connection:
a) PSI  licensing  shares  with  all  other  kind  of  licensing  the  feature
whereby it is based on ownership of IP; while IP licensing may be
used as a tool to restrict  exploitation of IP for profit  maximizing
purposes, as it happens in classic licensing and in digital licensing
of the first variety, it may also be used to open IP, to encourage and
steer re-use (see chapter 7), as it happens in digital licensing of the
second variety. However, PSI licensing exhibits a specificity in this
connection: the IP on which licensing is based is publicly owned,
i.e. it belongs to entities which have obtained it through taxpayers’
money; it would appear therefore that it stands to reason that profit
maximization through the combination of IP exclusivity and the re-
strictive features of licensing should not be the sole aim of PSI li-
censing, not only on the basis of the reasons underlying the second
variety of licensing (chapter 11), but for reasons of its own, that is
derived from the ownership regime of PSI.
b) What is the precise mix between lucrative and welfare enhancement
goals of PSIHs engaging in PSI licensing is  a matter for Member
States to decide, in ways which must however be compatible with
the underlying EU normative framework (including charging pol-
icy, which does not allow pure profit maximization; see Art. 6 of the
Directive).
35 See BENKLER, Y. 2004, 'Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing
as a Modality of Economic Production', Yale L.J., vol. 114, pp. 272 ff.; pp. 277 ff. and BENK-
LER, Y. 2002, 'Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm', in Yale L.J., vol. 112,
pp. 369 ff., where additional references.
36 See BENKLER, Y. 2006, The Wealth of Networks. How Social Production Transforms Mar-
kets  and Freedom,  Yale University Press,   also available at <http://www.benkler.org/won-
chapters.html>.
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c) The decision concerning the mix between lucrative and non-lucra-
tive goals in turn impacts on the features of PSI licensing, that is on
the question whether PSI licensing is conceived as a tool to restrict
or as a tool to “re-open” the restrictive features of IP.
d) In making the choice, several factors should be taken into account
(over and beyond the quite obvious point that the choice in favour
of IP exclusivity entails the taking into account also at the licensing
level of the usual functions of IP as an incentive to investment and
dissemination): 
i. the feasibility of licensing models that combine welfare gains
with economic profitability as shown by the experience of digi-
tal licensing of the second variety;
ii. the (enhanced)37  non rivalry and complementarity of PSI in-
puts;
iii. the relevance of the parties to PSI transactions. In this specific
connection, we should consider that, as a rule, in IP licensing,
the parties are either firms (licensor and licensee) or consumers
(as licensees). In PSI licensing, the original licensor is by defini-
tion a PSIH; moreover in PSI licensing an important role may be
played – and is indeed being played – by communities. Indeed,
when public,  non transactional,  open licensing of PSI applies,
online networks enable cooperation by dispersed members of a
community to work on data sets, matching them, refining them,
tagging them and so on.38
e) An argument may also be derived from the perception that IP own-
ership by PSIHs is a second best solution, in terms of welfare maxi-
mization, as compared to the public domain regime prevailing else-
where and notably in the U.S. If one shares this point, the reasons to
favour shaping PSI licensing in a way which opens rather than re-
stricting re-use would be greatly reinforced.
While  these  features  are PSI  specific,  they link back to the specificity
which PSI licensing shares with the other forms of digital licensing of the
second variety.
First, let us look at the question of  incentives. Incentives are crucial for
firm-to-firm IP licensing: down payments by licensee and minimum guar-
37 See chapter 9.
38 For examples see my Public Sector Information as Open Data, quoted above at note 29, § 3.
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anteed royalties may be required as proof of willingness to invest in the ex-
ploitation of the licensed IP. Exclusivity may be granted; but may be lost if a
certain level of sales or market penetration is not reached. Advertising ex-
penditure levels may be contractually mandated. On the contrary, members
of a community contributing to the enrichment of licensed PSI may be con-
tributing “small grains” of their time and attention; if  this is so, then the
question of incentives may become trivial;39 and indeed motivation to con-
tribute tends to be cooperative rather than exchange-based and economic.
Second, the creation of PSI-based products and services may contribute
social and public value, rather than market value. Therefore their value may
be measured not only in dollar benefits to the parties to the transaction, but
also in externalities, that is value to third parties which are not privy to the
license. In classic IP licensing, as well as in digital licensing of the first vari-
ety, this feature is at best incidental.
Third, in a time in which the cost of technological resources has dramati-
cally decreased, it has turned out that distributed modes of production may
at times turn out to have distinctive competitive advantages over markets and
hierarchies in dealing with information; and that the net  enables forms of
cooperation based on modularity of tasks, communication and community
building which in  several instances have consistently outperformed even
the very best businesses.40
Fourth, PSI-incorporating data sets created and maintained on the basis
of peer production may, in the absence of restrictive terms of licenses man-
dating non-commercial re-use at any point of the chain of authorizations, be
transformed into value-added products or services, commanding a price on
the market. In this regard, PSI licensing may contribute to emergence of a
hybrid  model,  where  market  and non-market  modes  of  production  seam-
lessly coexist.
Fifth, the defining feature of PSI re-use, its ex ante unpredictability, stays in
stark contrast with one of the defining features of classic IP licensing and
digital licensing of the first variety, which strive to reach completeness of
contract terms, by precisely defining the geographical  areas, the fields of
use, the quantities as well as the minute details (including procurement and
quality levels of raw materials to be obtained by licensees; or number of li-
39 BENKLER, Y. 2002, 'Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm',quoted above at
note 35, p. 376.
40 See BENKLER, Y. 2011,  The Penguin and the Leviathan. The Triumph of Cooperation Over
Self-Interest, Crown Business, New York, pp. 169 ff.
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censed stations in LANs) which may be required to make sure that profit
maximization is obtained.
12. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
To the extent one is persuaded that the results of the comparison between
“classical” IP licensing and digital licensing of the first variety on the one
side and digital licensing of the second variety and specifically of PSI licens-
ing on the other side have some merit, we may proceed to rephrase the orig-
inal question: to which extent the optimal design of the rules concerning the
former may be relevant for PSI licensing? or, in other words, what are the
components of the design which should be adapted and changed to take
into account the differences between the two?
13. THE DESIGN OF THE RULES CONCERNING CLASSIC IP 
LICENSING
The design of classic IP licensing has three components: (i)  the establish-
ment of the IPRs which are the subject matter of licensing; (ii) contract law
rules for the licensing; and (iii) conflict of laws rules which select the appli-
cable law when licensing has a link to more than one legal system. 
i. This  first  component  was  established  at  different  times,  ranging
from the Eighteenth century to present days depending on the dif-
ferent jurisdictions. The twin pillars of the Paris Convention (1883)
and of the Berne Convention (1886) formed the basis for interna-
tional licensing concerning the subject matter dealt with in the two
Conventions (basically: trademarks, designs, patents and copyright)
by enabling non-national rightholders to obtain access to the protec-
tion  of  their  symbols,  inventions  and  creations  throughout  the
States parties to the conventions.  In areas where this  has not yet
been accomplished, as is in the case of geographical indications, in-
ternational licensing still is disabled.
ii. It has been up to the legal systems of the different jurisdictions to
set  up  rules  governing  the  relationship  between licensor  and li-
censee for the different IPRs. Generally resort has been made to ref-
erence to general contract law rules; a modicum of default rules ap-
ply, in areas such as the warranties owed by licensor to licensee and
on the impact of finding of invalidity on the continued validity of
the transaction and on the repayment of royalties previously paid
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by licensee,  but  the number and importance of default  rules has
been very limited. There are a few mandatory provisions, though,
on two possible grounds. First, one of the parties may be seen as
weaker, as typically is  the case with the licensor/creator of copy-
right protected works. Second, licensing agreements may have an
impact on third parties. A typical example of the latter situation is
dealt with by the antitrust scrutiny of the possible anticompetitive
impact of licensing, e.g. in connection with no-attack clauses, recip-
rocal  licensing,  exclusivity  and  territorial  restrictions.  In  the  EU
freedom of movement rules (Artt. 28 ff. TFEU) may impact on par-
allel imports and therefore typically on behaviour by purchasers of
IP incorporating goods rather than on behaviour of the parties to li-
censing.
iii. In the light of the limited interest of the various jurisdictions in-
volved in shaping the specifics of the transaction, the principle of
freedom to choose the applicable law prevails, with the sole excep-
tion  of  mandatory  provisions  which  may  at  times  override  the
choice of law made by the parties.
14. WHAT DESIGN SHOULD BE ADOPTED FOR PSI 
LICENSING?
If we follow the same blueprint in trying to figure out what is the optimal
design of rules concerning PSI licensing, then the following remarks seem to
be in place. 
In connection with item (i), no special rules are required to establish IP pro-
tection for PSI; they are already in place.41 The holder of PSI, however, nor-
mally is a public sector body, here designated as PSIH. It stands to reason
that, as the PSI was created and organized by means of taxpayers’ money, a
certain amount of regulation is provided for by legislatures in matters such
the existence and the extent of the obligation to license and the price of li-
censing. Both aspects are dealt with in the current Directive and in the pro-
posal under discussion: see Artt. 3 and 6. However, for the reasons indi-
cated in chapter 7, the option to shape licensing as a tool to engage in a cer-
tain amount of “re-opening” whatever restriction is implicit in IP protection
41 Conversely, in legal systems which deliberately decided to rule out IP protection for federal
government generated data re-use is not made conditional on the acceptance of licensing
conditions: for references see my  Public Sector Information as Open Data, quoted above at
note 29, § 4.
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should be given a certain amount of weight. This approach would appear to
be in line with Recital 22 of the Directive, which, as previously noted, states:
“The Directive does not affect the existence or ownership of intellectual property
rights of public sector bodies, nor does it limit the exercise of these rights in any
way beyond the boundaries set by this Directive…Public sector bodies should, how-
ever, exercise their copyright in a way that facilitates re-use”.
The question which specially concerns us here is about the legal rules
concerning  the  relationship  between  licensor  and  licensee,  or,  in  other
words, the PSIH and the re-user. It would appear that PSI licensing does not
require special rules concerning the balance between the interests and the
obligations  of  licensor  and  licensee.  We  have  seen  that  this  aspect  has
drawn only a modicum of attention from sovereigns even in “classical” IP
licensing; one would expect that this is even more so in connection with PSI
licensing, considering that here the priority would seem not to be the bal-
ance  between  the  respective  rights  and  obligations42 as  the  adoption  of
mechanisms appropriate in view of fostering the potential for cooperation
between the different parties involved (see above, chapter 7).
Of course, there may be a certain difficulty in trying to imagine which le-
gal rules may foster the desired cooperation between parties involved in the
re-use of PSI. However, a few points may be made at this stage.
First, the rules should take into due account the character of the licensed
entity, which is non rival both in consumption and in production and shows
a marked attitude  to  complementarity  (see  above,  chapter  9).  Therefore,
rules  favouring  standardization  and  interoperability  of  licensing  terms
should be adopted, in view of the objective of maximizing the possibility of
the matching of data sets and the creation of downstream products and ser-
vices based on the aggregation of various PSI components. At least in spe-
cific sectors and areas, more decisive progress than the one presently con-
templated (see above chapter 2) might also be sought in connection with the
technological dimension (formats, interoperability, asset lists).
Second, the decision whether to adopt top down national licenses should
undergo stringent scrutiny. The rationale for adopting national rules, rooted
in the specifics of a given legal system, links back to the fact that the rele-
vant PSI was created and organized by a given PSIH, which is based in a
42 This does not mean that general  purpose legislation  providing protection to consumers
would not be relevant; the point is that such legislation, which is mandatory, would apply
without need of specific adaptation to the relationship between licensor and those licensees
that are members of the general public.
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specific jurisdiction, so that it would at first blush appear that it stands to
reason that the PSIH acquires rights and undertakes obligations on the basis
of its own legal system also when dissemination of PSI is concerned. How-
ever, this argument does not stand to scrutiny when one considers that even
national sovereigns have an interest in fostering cooperation in the exploita-
tion of a non rival  resource  showing a high degree of complementarity,
without regard to the fact that the candidate digital input is foreign or na-
tional;  and one keeps in  mind that  national  licenses  do not  mix  easily.43
Moreover, in the EU perspective the positive obligation of Member States to
contribute to the creation of the internal market would play an important
role. In any event the fact that a given data set has a given national “entry
point”, e.g. data collected by a British PSIH, should not unduly influence
the rules by which it is governed at some later stage of its – in all likelihood
quite roundabout – life cycle, any more than any given car first put into cir-
culation in the UK should be governed by British law even when it travels
abroad.
This reasoning might be resisted if it was proved that in “classical” IP li -
censing national sovereigns have shown a strong interest in shaping the re-
ciprocal  relation of licensor and licensee,  except that this  is  not the case:
with a few exceptions,44 legislatures have seen it fit to adopt a hands-off atti-
tude, leaving it to the parties to deal with each other; to the point that even
choice of applicable law is as a rule left to the choice of the parties to a li-
cense.
Third, we should go a step further and ask ourselves whether it would
be appropriate for national legislatures – and the EU providing a frame-
work for them – to take positive steps towards fostering and promoting co-
operation between the parties involved in the re-use of PSI. The case may be
made that PSI licensing provides an opportunity for the EU and its Member
States  to  assist  the  emergence  of  a  lex  communitaria,  where  the  adjective
refers to  re-users communities  rather  than to the EU Community,  which
might be seen as a present day parallel to the emergence of the lex mercatoria
which came to prevail in the later Middle Ages when municipalities and
cross-border trade flourished. The components of this body of law may be
43 For references in demonstrating this – quite self-explanatory – point see my Public Sector In-
formation as Open Data, quoted above at note 29, § 3. The point should also be added that in-
teroperability requires that automatically reprocessable metadata are built in licenses, in-
cluding their semantic representation in accordance with the Linked Data approach, which
is a task which probably would be hardly manageable  by the legislators of 29 Member
States and is best undertaken by private ordering having a global dimension. 
44 See above, chapter 14.
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gleaned, considering that legal systems should favour processes of  delocal-
ization, whereby the relationship should to the extent possible be governed
by rules which are not nationally rooted but rely on the practices and per-
ceptions of the community to which re-users belong. It should be under-
lined that this idea does not link back to ideas of independence of the cy-
berspace from ancient  regulators,  which obtained some popularity a few
decades ago45 but has in the meantime proved simplistic and inappropriate
in view of the multiple interactions between virtual and brick-and-mortar
worlds. Rather the idea should link to successful experiments in self-regula-
tion, where some experiences of homogeneous communities like advertis-
ing and stock exchanges come to mind, and to the experience of the speedy
and  well  received  dispute  resolution  mechanism  concerning  domain
names46 would appear to provide a valuable template and starting point. 
The point here is not that sovereigns should keep their hands off; rather,
that they should intervene by fostering the creation and the deployment of
rules which are conducive to the cooperation between members of a com-
munity in order to optimize the benefits obtained by products and services
which  show  a  high  rate  of  positive  externalities.  This  new role  may  be
played in the designing of an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism, to
begin with;47 and might extend to the creation of “black” or (better) “gray
lists”, indicating which license clauses may hinder or restrict interoperabil-
ity.
Other components might well prove advisable and possibly important. It
is a common experience that making disparate sets of licenses work seam-
lessly is not an easy task; legal practice as we know it today does not have
either the know-how or the cost structure to be of much help; so that it is
possible to imagine that State funded bodies, possibly at the local level, pro-
vide the required assistance, also by creating FAQs and publishing a grow-
ing body of questions asked and replies provided.48
This approach entails a few corollaries and requires a few qualifications.
States still have several overriding interests which may emerge in connec-
45 As proposed by JOHNSON, D. R. & POST, D. 1996, 'Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace',  Stanford L.  Rev.,  vol.  48, pp.  1367 ff.;  see also TEUBNER, G.  1997, '“Global
Bukovina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society', in G. Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a
State, Dartmouth Publishing Co., Aldershot, Brookfield, U.S.A., Singapore, Sidney, pp. 16 ff.
46 On the UDPR see ABBOTT, F. M., COTTIER, T. & GURRY, F. 2007, International Intellectual
Property in an Integrated World Economy, Wolters Kluwer, Austin, Boston, pp. 394 ff.
47 The Commission Decisions 2011/833/EU of 12 December 2011 on the re-use of Commission
information, in OJ 14 December 2011, L 330/39, falls short of the “wish list” contained in this
document on most accounts.
48 The Piedmont region has been active in this connection for several years: see <http://selili. -
polito.it/>.
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tion  with  the  workings  of  PSI  licenses.  Competition  law should be  one;
nothing here suggests that PSI should be immunized from competition law;
on the contrary, the fact that the PSI directive contains a mini-body of an-
titrust (see above chapter 2) and that EU and national competition rules ap-
plies is to be seen with relief, to avoid that market power undermines the
workings of online communities. Data protection law would be another im-
portant example. Here the suggestion is that, as data protection rules are
mandatory, they are by definition to be complied with by all  the parties
having the required link to the EU privacy, so that there is no need that the
corresponding  obligations  are  “contractualized”  by  being  duplicated  by
some license provision; to come back to an issue left open above (in chapter
2), licenses should be “decoupled” from undertakings from re-users of PSI
to respect data protection rules.49
Would PSIHs have reasons to object to the application of the lex commu-
nitaria as briefly sketched above? This is a possibility, as PSIHs might feel
more comfortable with the application of national licenses. In turn, national
political elites might lose interest in pushing forward the process, in that the
public relations effect of releasing PSI under rules which do not carry a “na-
tional  brand”  might  be  deemed  lessened.  Both  these  aspects  should  be
taken into account, under the heading of “backfiring” (chapter 2 above).
Also private players may have reasons to object to the application of the
lex communitaria. Imagine a business offering for a price a value added and
PSI-incorporating  product  or  service.  It  does  stand  to  reason  that  this
provider might wish that the relationship with customers is predetermined,
by reference to a given set of terms and conditions and by the choice of an
applicable law, ideally that of the place of business of the provider itself.
This is a difficult  case. On the one side one might stress the fact that the
emergence of hybrid models, on which we earlier insisted, entails that busi-
nesses should be allowed to opt in the law they select and opt out of  lex
communitaria and all the appurtenant trappings (including the dispute reso-
lution mechanism). On the other side, we cannot forget that even PSI incor-
porated into a value added product and service is subject to the “travelling
clauses” which we discussed earlier; so that a later choice of law by the last
entity in the chain of authorizations is not liable to rescind the effect of the
49 This is also the recommendation by MORANDO, F. 2012, Ad Hoc Licenses, Dominant License
Models and (the Lack of) Interoperability, quoted above at note 5. In this regard the approach
taken by the Commission Decisions 2011/833/EU of 12 December 2011 on the re-use of Com-
mission information, quoted above at note 48, Art. 6, is to be approved.
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terms and conditions of the prior licenses travelling along with the last one.
What one can say at this stage is that a lot of patience and creativity is re-
quired to unravel that part of the puzzle.
15. CONCLUSION
This exercise may be criticized in several ways. It may be seen as overly aca-
demic; worse, it may be argued that it does not deliver what is promised.
More specifically, any component of guidance from the Commission to the
Member States is missing. This would probably be fair criticism. However,
it should also be considered that in the last few years we have been talking
about “licensing” without controlling the conditions of use of the term; and
that, as a result, the tower of Babel of mutually incompatible licensing terms
and conditions has been increasing, rather than decreasing. Fact is that the
cure cannot be decided, until the exact terms of the disease have been iden-
tified. Here it is submitted that what has been lacking all along is an analy-
sis which deals with the special characteristic of licensing, when the autho-
rization concerns PSI and when the licensing is a component of a coopera-
tive, rather than market-based, exchange. This has contributed to making
the quest for interoperability and the search for the design of the institu-
tions capable of maximizing welfare deriving from PSI re-use two missions
impossible to accomplish. In this perspective, it would appear that stepping
back and looking at the missing pieces of the jigsaw puzzle is the best op-
tion.
This is even more so, if one considers that the EU is confronted with the
chance to establish what role the same EU and its Member States may play,
in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity, to contribute to the initial
emergence of rules which are appropriate for digital network driven, coop-
erative exchanges, which, is submitted, may still form the most advanced
and productive part of the digital agenda taking shape. When this broader
task is accomplished, also the more minute and mundane task of drafting
guidance will follow.
